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Abstract 
This article investigates the effect of prices and socio-demographic variables on the farmers’ decision 
to purchase agricultural insurance. A survey has been conducted to 200 farmers most of whom are 
engaged in diversified income-generating activities. The logistic estimation results suggest that 
education and household income from farming activities positively affect the likelihood of purchasing 
insurance. The demand for insurance is negatively correlated with the premium paid per insured value, 
suggesting that insurance is a normal good. Farmers are willing to pay (WTP) increasingly higher 
premiums for contracts with higher coverage ratio. According to the valuation model, the WTP declines 
sharply for coverage ratios under 70%. 
Keywords: Agricultural Insurance, Willingness to Pay, Logistic Model, Index Insurance 
1. Introduction 
It is well known that agriculture is a risky business. Several risks exist from the beginning of the 
production cycle until the harvest period. While mitigation is the primary choice to reduce undesirable 
consequences, the realization of losses can be devastating on the farmers’ income. Studies suggest that 
an effective insurance scheme can transfer risk to other financial markets (Joint Research Centre 2013; 
Bielza, et al. 2009; Carriquiri & Osgood 2012). By reducing the production risk, insurance can 
motivate farmers to specialize in high-productivity farming activities (Barrett & McPeak 2006). It is 
also possible that the right insurance schemes can motivate farmers to apply effective mitigation 
techniques (World Bank 2005; Mahul & Stutley 2010).  
The trend around the world is to promote and subsidize agricultural insurance as the common practice 
for optimal risk management. In theory, the difference between farmers willingness to pay (WTP) for 
insurance and the actuarially fair premium needs to be calculated and then financed by the state 
(Juanchang & Jiyu 2010; Herbold 2010). In practice, the decisions are usually not based on economic 
analysis, but rather political motivations. The recent US Farm Bill 2014 shifted the direct payments 
into crop insurance subsidies. This bold move created additional controversy around why insurance 
needs to be subsidized and who benefits from the subsidized insurance policies. According to Lynch & 
Bjerga (2013), a significant portion of those subsidies go to insurance companies. Their report also 
suggests that affluent growers benefit more under the new subsidized insurance schemes.  
In Europe, the agricultural insurance system is widely diversified. While European Commission aims 
to unify the different schemes, each country has its own system. Some member states such as Spain 
offer substantial subsidies, whereas some states do not have such advanced subsidization schemes 
(Anton & Kimura 2011). The rules and regulations also differ within each state. Public insurance is the 
dominant factor in Spain, whereas farmers enter into collective bargaining in Italy.  
The Turkish agricultural insurance system is somewhere in between the European and American 
systems. While self-sustainability is the primary concern, it is the government policy to promote and 
subsidize agricultural insurance. The current norm in Turkey is that about 50% of the premium is paid 
by the government, whereas the rest is paid by the farmer. For some commercially vital products that 
have export potential, the subsidies can be as high as 66%. The problem with those subsidies is that 
they can cause an imbalance not only in the insurance market but also the agrarian product market as 
they are not based on any economic model.  
A better way to determine the optimal subsidy rate is to derive the actual WTP for insurance and the 
state shall pay the rest. In order to understand how much farmers are willing to pay for agricultural 
insurance, a survey has been conducted in the central Anatolian basin in Turkey. While the survey area 
is a localized, the results and the methodology can easily be extended to different regions of the world.  
2. Data 
The data is based on a recent survey conducted in capital region of Turkey. 200 farmers from the region 
were interviewed about their opinions on potential insurance schemes. Out of 200 observations 128 has 
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purchased insurance, whereas 72 is not insured. Most of these farmers are also engaged in other 
income-generating activities. The annual household income from farming activities is relatively low, 
but this is offset by other income. These farmers adopt self-sufficiency concept. Also, most of their 
farming activities are off the book. A substantial portion of the farm-produced products are utilized for 
family use without making into the commercial markets. 
Insurance is a very familiar concept among these farmers. Thanks to extensive government-supported 
ad campaigns, the link between insurance and access to credit is well known in the area. Many have to 
purchase insurance to get access to credit. In fact, it is the primary reason for insurance coverage. Of 
course there are reasons as well. The responses of farmers, regarding their decision to buy agricultural 
insurance are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Why Farmers Buy Insurance? 
Reason Percentage Frequency Actual Frequency 
Legal Requirement to Access Credit 40.625% 52 
Protection Against Losses 21.875% 28 
Networking Affects 18.75% 24 
Government Ads 12.5% 16 
Other / No Response 6.25% 8 
As a part of the survey, we asked about the primary reasons to purchase insurance. The responses 
revealed interesting results. The number one reason why farmers prefer to buy insurance is because 
they have to. 40.625% of the respondents indicated that it is legally required to be covered under an 
insurance scheme. This is quite interesting as the agricultural insurance is not mandatory in the area. 
However, it is linked with credit. So, insurance provides access to credit. The bundling of insurance 
with credit is the primary reason for insurance purchase. 
Protection is the primary reason for insurance purchase among only 21.875% of the respondents. This 
low ratio is probably due to the fact that farmers are engaged in diversified income activities. The 
diversification of income sources offers the farmers a relatively stable income, reducing the need for 
additional income protection measures.  
18.75% of the farmers indicated that they are purchasing insurance because their neighbors/relatives 
are also buying it. Government sponsored ads are the primary purchase reasons for 12.5% of the 
farmers. 
Table 2. Why Farmers Do Not Buy Insurance? 
Reason Percentage Frequency Actual Frequency 
No need  44.44% 32 
Cost issues 33.33% 24 
Too small to be insured 16.67% 12 
Other / No Response 5.56% 4 
About 36% of those surveyed responded that they are not currently insured. A dominant portion 
(44.44%) of the respondents who are not insured stated that they believe agricultural insurance is 
unnecessary. Those farmers have an idea about agricultural insurance, but they do not like the fact that 
their premiums are not returned if the risk is not realized. 33.33% of those who prefer to be uninsured 
listed the additional cost as their primary reason not to buy insurance. About 16.67% of the farmers 
suggested that they are small farmers and that is the reason why they are not insured.  
3. Methods 
The methodology used in this article is two-fold. First, a logistic regression is utilized to quantify the 
factors which might affect the agricultural households’ demand for insurance. Following Train’s (2003) 
notation and McFadden’s framework (1980) the estimated regression is parameterized as  
 
(1)  
If we define the related parameters in linear form such that Vnj = βxnj, then the logistic probability with 
only two alternatives can be written as  
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(2)  
In the above regression xn refers to household specific socio-demographic information such as 
education level, income from farming activities, income from off-farming activities, household size, 
and union membership. The vector β measures the effects of the above-mentioned variables on 
insurance purchase probabilities.  
Factor Effect = β1 (Education) + β2 (Farming Income) + β3 (Off-Farm Income) + β4 
(Household Size) + β5 (Union Membership) (3)  
Next, I estimated the farmer’s WTP for insurance using contingent valuation method. Contingent 
valuation models and willingness to pay studies have been widely utilized in designing optimal 
mechanism designs (Horowitz & McConnell 2002). Several methods were suggested on this technique 
in Alberini & Kahn (2006). Following their work, both open-ended and take-it or leave-it types of 
questions were used to derive the demand curves. In the derived demand curves, the prices are defined 
as the percentages of insured values and the quantities are defined as percentages of farmers who are 
willing to pay those prices. However, some farmers responded to low-coverage insurance products with 
a valuation of “0”. The zero values were dealt as suggested by Strazzera et al. (2003).  
4. Binary Logistic Results 
In the binary logistic regression, success is defined as insurance purchase, whereas failure is defined as 
not being covered. Thus, the dependent variable takes ‘0’ for the null case. The explanatory variables 
are education, farming income, off-the farm income, household size and experience with union. The 
results are as follows. 
Table 3. Logistic Regression Results 
Predictor Coefficient Standard 
Deviation 
p-value Odds 
Ratio 
Lower 
Confidence 
Upper 
Confidence 
Constant -1.177 0.637 0.065    
Education 0.612* 0.252 0.015 1.84 1.12 3.03 
Farming Income 
( 1000) 
0.126* 0.057 0.026 1.22 1.06 2.42 
Off-Farm Income 
( 1000) 
0.036 0.056 0.516 1.02 0.81 1.31 
Household Size -0.115 0.209 0.582 0.89 0.59 1.34 
Union Membership 0.389 0.382 0.308 1.48 0.7 3.12 
* Significant at 5%. Log-Likelihood = -104.582 
The p-value for the regression suggests a significant model. Chi-square tests measured as suggested by 
Pearson, Deviance, and Hosmer-Lemeshow are 175, 187, and 21. Thus, the defined equation works 
well with the data. The observed frequencies and expected frequencies also match closely with each 
other. The concordant pair association is calculated as 75.5%, and the discordant pair association is 
23.9%. These ratios suggest strong measures of association between the response variables and 
predicted probabilities.  
Education, which is defined as a scale from 0 to 4, is a strong factor in explaining the decision to 
purchase insurance. Its p-value is 0.015, which suggests a statistically significant variable. Both 
farming income and off-the-farm income are also positively related with the insurance purchase 
decision, but only farming income is statistically significant. Household size and union membership are 
not statistically significant factors.  
5. Estimating Willingness to Pay for Insurance 
Using contingent valuation model, I estimated the farmers’ demand function for a range of premium 
prices which are defined in terms of insured values. In the survey, there were specifically designed 
questions on estimating how much farmers are willing to pay for different levels of insurance coverage. 
This implicit insurance pricing model is derived for crop insurance, fruit insurance, and livestock 
insurance. 
4.1 Estimating Willingness to Pay for Crop Insurance 
Crops are usually the easiest agricultural products to be insured. As they do not suffer that much from 
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unexpected rain, frost, or similar risks, they are subject to relatively lower risks compared to fruits and 
livestock.  
The following graph visualizes the demand curves for crop insurance at each level of coverage:   
Graph 1: Demand for Crop Insurance 
 
 
The regression line on the top of the graph gives the demand curve for full coverage with no 
deductibles. This graph suggests that the maximum willingness to pay for crop-value insurance is 5% 
of the premium for the insurance type which offer full coverage with no deductibles. However, only 
3% of the farmers are willing to pay a premium up to that much. In order to cover at least half of the 
population, the maximum premium should be 2% of the insured value for crop insurance for such 
coverage. If the premiums fall to 1%, then almost 97% of the farming population will show interest in 
full crop insurance. As the level of coverage declines, farmer’s willingness to pay also declines. The 
decline in willingness to pay becomes much sharper when the coverage ratio falls below 70%.  
4.2 Estimating Willingness to Pay for Fruit Insurance 
The willingness to pay for fruit insurance is higher than that of crop insurance. The graph below shows 
the farmers’ hypothetical demand curve for fruit insurance. Similarly, the price premium in y-axis is 
defined in terms of insured value, and the x-scale shows percentage of farmers showing purchase 
interest at each premium.  
 
Graph 2: Demand for Fruit Insurance 
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Fruit is a more valuable and vulnerable asset compared to crop. The revenue per fruit land is 
substantially higher than the revenue derived from crops for the same area. Fruit production is also 
riskier. While frost and hail does not have that much affect on crop production, an unexpected 
realization of these risks can be devastating for fruit producers. Aware of those risks, the farmers’ 
willingness to pay for fruit insurance is substantially higher. Some farmers are willing to pay for as 
high as 10% of the insured value for that type of insurance. A premium of 4% covers 56% of the 
farmers who are protected by full coverage. The participation ratio falls to 35% for 90% coverage (10% 
deductible), and sharply falls to 18% for 80% coverage (20% deductible).  
4.3 Estimating Willingness to Pay for Livestock Insurance 
Insuring livestock has similarities and also differences from insuring vegetations. Livestock is usually 
well protected from rain and frost. Farmers can also take precautionary actions against drought as well. 
The main risk factor in livestock is the spread of disease. The appearance of diseases can be both 
sporadic and systematic. Once a contagious disease emerges in a barn, there is a high risk of losing the 
entire pack. Therefore, it is of critical importance for the farmers to have insurance to protect 
themselves from such disasters.  
By quantifying the respondents’ answers, one can drive the demand function for insurance. Similar to 
crop and fruit insurance, I derived the insurance demand for full coverage, 90% coverage, 80% 
coverage, 70% coverage, 60% coverage and 50% coverage levels. The graph below visualizes the 
demand for livestock insurance at each level of coverage.  
 
Graph 3: Demand for Livestock Insurance 
 
Similar to the case for fruits, farmers are willing to pay pretty high premiums for livestock insurance 
compared to crop insurance. 3% of the farmers indicated that they are willing to pay up to 10% for full 
coverage. A modest premium of 2.5% for full coverage is enough to provide insurance to 80% of the 
respondents. This ratio falls to 60% for a coverage ratio of 90%, and it falls to 35% for a coverage ratio 
of 80%. Farmers do not show any interest in purchasing insurance for livestock that offers coverage of 
below 70% of insured value.  
5. Conclusion 
The analysis of survey responses revealed several interesting results. According to the survey, farmers 
are buying insurance primarily because it is attached to credit. Government sponsored ads and 
networking effects are also positive impediments to acquire insurance coverage. Education and farming 
income increase the chances to buy agricultural insurance among rural households. Similar to Sundar 
and Ramakrishnan’s findings (2013), a substantial portion of the farmers believe that insurance is not 
necessary for small farmers. This belief is a serious drawback in insuring small farmers.  
Horowitz & McConnell suggest that the difference between willingness to pay and willingness to 
accept also depends on income factor (2003). As income rises, this price differential might get narrower 
reducing the need for insurance subsidies. The demand for insurance is a normal good and the farmers 
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WTP declines sharply for lower coverage levels. The results suggest that most farmers are willing to 
pay a meaningful amount for full coverage, but their WTP declines sharply for insurance schemes that 
offer less than 80% coverage. It is also striking that most farmers are not willing to pay anything for 
coverage below 70%. That creates a substantial challenge to index-based insurance schemes where the 
payments are determined by an external index threshold. It is suggested that the correlation between the 
index and the losses should be at least 70% for a sustainable index-insurance scheme.  
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